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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The 1985 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 was not 
merely remedial or procedural. It increased by ten-fold the 
amount defendants were required to pay to prevent foreclosure on 
the subject real property. The change was substantive, and the 
trial court's application of the 1985 amendment to the subject 
trust deed unconstitutionally impaired the contract. 
The trust deed, which was executed prior to the 1985 
amendments, gave the creditor the option to "foreclose this 
Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of 
mortgages on real property," This provision incorporated the 
law of foreclosure as it existed when the trust deed was signed. 
Even if the 1985 amendment does govern this case, plaintiff 
did not irrevocably elect to proceed by judicial foreclosure 
until it filed its complaint herein, which was after defendants 
had tendered payment of the delinquency. Because plaintiff had 
not made an irrevocable election, defendants were still entitled 
to cure the delinquency as provided in the trust deed statutes. 
Defendants' tender of the delinquency was adequate as a matter 
of law, because Darrell D. Tanner testified, without contradic-
tion, that he had the ability to cause The Ridge Athletic Club, 
Inc., to pay the delinquency on the date of the tender. 
Finally, plaintiff is not entitled to a security interest 
in new equipment and other personal property placed on the 
subject real property by The Ridge Athletic Club, Inc., an 
entity which did not sign any security agreement or other 
documents with plaintiff. The plaintiff's security interest 
extends only to personal property owned or acquired by Sherwood 
Associates. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE 1985 AMENDMENT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-31 
AFFECTED SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS. 
Plaintiff correctly argues that statutory amendments which 
affect only remedies or procedures, but which do not affect 
substantive rights, may be applied to contracts executed prior 
2 
to the effective date of the amendment. The amendment at issue 
in this case is not, however, merely remedial or procedural. 
The cases cited by plaintiff are distinguishable and can be 
generally explained as exercises of police power. Retroactive 
application of the 1985 amendment cannot be justified under the 
constitutional analysis set forth in recent United States 
Supreme Court decisions and decision of other states. 
Plaintiff relies heavily on the United States Supreme Court 
case of Home Building and Loan Assfn v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 
(1934), which upheld a Minnesota mortgage moratorium law passed 
in response to the Great Depression of the 1930fs, and on other 
cases of a similar vintage. The cases are distinguishable and 
not applicable to the present situation in Utah. ,f[I]t is now 
recognized that the court's holding in Blaisdell was based on 
the emergency which then existed." Portland Savings Bank v. 
Landry, 372 A.2d 573, 576 (Me. 1977). The court in Blaisdell 
upheld the Minnesota act only because it met five criteria 
related to the emergency: 
Upholding the constitutionality of the 
Minnesota act, the court identified five 
criteria by which a legislative enactment 
could survive a challenge based on impair-
ment of contract: (1) an emergency created 
a need for the measure; (2) the legislation 
was addressed to a legitimate public purpose 
and not for the mere advantage of particular 
individuals; (3) the relief afforded was 
appropriate to the emergency; (4) the 
conditions imposed by the act were reason-
able; and (5) the statute was temporary and 
limited to the exigency which called it 
forth. 
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Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Arnold, 426 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Iowa 
1988) (citing Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444-47). 
Recent pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court 
have refined the balancing test established in Blaisdell to a 
three-step analysis: 
In the years since Blaisdell and 
Worthen.l the United States Supreme Court 
has refined the test for contract clause 
challenges to a 3-step analysis: (1) if the 
state law operates as a substantial impair-
ment of a contractual relationship, (2) the 
state must have a significant and legitimate 
public purpose behind the regulation, which 
(3) adjusts the contracting parties1 rights 
and responsibilities based on reasonable 
conditions appropriate to the public 
purpose. 
Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Arnold, 426 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Iowa 
1988) (citing Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & 
Light Company, 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983)). 
Application of these criteria to the statute at issue in 
the instant case establishes that it may not constitutionally be 
applied to contracts executed before the effective date of the 
1985 amendment. First, the amendment does operate* as a substan-
tial impairment of Darrell Tanner's rights. In the absence of 
the amendment, defendants would have been required to pay 
approximately $119,200.00 to cure the default and prevent 
foreclosure. (R. 352.) If the 1985 amendment is applied, 
however, the amount necessary to forestall foreclosure would 
1W. D. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56 (1935), a 
case which found unconstitutional an Arkansas statute which 
dramatically changed the terms by which the payment of special 
assessments on municipal bonds were enforced. 
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have been approximately $1,118,984.90. (R. 353-54.) This 
nearly ten-fold increase in the amount necessary to prevent 
foreclosure is clearly a substantial and substantive change. 
Second, there is no evidence that the State of Utah had any 
"significant and legitimate public purpose" for giving retroac-
tive effect to such a substantive modification, and indeed there 
is no evidence that the legislature intended the statute to have 
retroactive effect. 
Third, even if there were some significant public purpose, 
there is no indication that the 1985 amendment "adjusts the 
contracting parties1 rights and responsibilities based on 
reasonable conditions appropriate to the public purpose." 
Application of these principles have been illustrated in 
other cases more factually similar to the case at bar. In 
Portland Savings Bank v. Landry, 372 A.2d 573 (Me. 1977), for 
example, the court considered a statute which reduced to 90 days 
the period for redemption after a foreclosure sale, whereas the 
redemption period had previously been one year. Although 
application of the arguments espoused by plaintiff herein would 
indicate that the statute only affected the remedy, the Maine 
Supreme Court nonetheless held the statute unconstitutional as 
applied to contracts executed prior to its effective date. 
Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Arnold, 426 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1988) 
also dealt with a statutory modification of the redemption 
period and of other aspects of the foreclosure process. The 
statute was enacted in response to "the suffering and disloca-
5 
tion which has wracked Iowa farm families in recent years." 426 
N.W.2d at 154. Although the Iowa legislature did have a 
legitimate and significant public purpose, the Iowa Supreme 
Court held that the statute used was not constitutionally 
justifiable if applied to existing contracts. See also Burke v. 
E. L. C. Investors, Inc., 110 Wis.2d 406, 329 N.W.2d 259 (Ct. 
App. 1982) (also holding unconstitutional a modification of the 
statutory redemption period). 
The cases cited by plaintiff as illustrating permissible 
modifications of contracts are distinguishable. Plaintiff 
relies on Columbian Building and Loan Co. v. Meddles, 34 Ohio L. 
Abs. 484, 35 N.E.2d 902 (1941), and on Whalen v. Citizens 
Building and Loan Co. , 67 Ohio App. 139, 36 N.E.2d 54 (1940). 
The statute at issue in those two cases was initially enacted in 
1937, and subsequently amended in 1939, and provided for a two-
year limitation on the enforcement of deficiency judgments. The 
contracts at issue had been executed and foreclosed upon prior 
to the enactment of the statutes. The decisions of the Ohio 
courts in Columbian and Whalen upheld the statute. The deci-
sions can initially be explained as an exercise of police power, 
because the statute in question was evidently enacted in 
response to the Great Depression. In addition, the enactment of 
a statute of limitation on the enforcement of a deficiency 
judgment is procedural, and does not affect substantive rights 
to the same extent as the amendment at issue in the instant 
case. 
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intxuL axo, ^ , i ^ - — Guardian Depositors Corp. v. 
Powers, 296 Mich, - The statut* =*t 
issue als lepressior v ^ -laiutt , nAte.i at- •*-•''/ 
judnr uie excess ** * * *• <-: * • • - *r- -air market value. 
The limitdt. ^ n arp. . ; . • advertisement 
wherp « ;redr" : w t:»- purchaser. ,*- .oui: jpr*c JL the 
01 m e changed conditions v; i rh . i:i occurred 
since * ,«r enactment r - nidue 
amendment necessary - implement the legislative Intent of thf 
f) ,r I o i" s t 31111 p " - . 
In the past a public sale has been thought 
to be the best method of enabling the 
mortgagor to realize the fair value of his 
premises. However, when the realty market 
is demoralized, that method of protecting 
the rights of a mortgagor becomes a mere 
formality. It is then within the province 
of the legislature, in order to prevent 
injustice, to set up new machinery for the 
enforcement of the obligation which will 
safeguard the rights of the debtor and 
secure to the creditor that which is his 
due. No one has a vested substantive right 
to more than is his due. 
296 N.W. " 
The statute a*: issue in Guardian is further distinguishable 
because t^- i* : -.ature haa expressly declared its intent that 
the statute ;:-e given retroac; . • * • - .;«:>'. N "W at 6 7 ; 
Finally, plaintiff relies . Holloway v. Barrett, c :,> v. 
iH" , 'il i" 'H I: I"I " •'"'' v . • : <e Guardian, addressed rr.p 
constitutionality c a ,*-.* ,: . . . J
 a >-*. -• . -'r-m 
to the difference between the fair market aiue i ;* t;.e t t 
rathei than thti difference between the foreclosure sale price 
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and the debt. As in Guardian, the Nevada Supr€»me Court upheld 
the statute based on the principle that "mortgagees are con-
stitutionally entitled to no more than payment in full. They 
cannot be heard to complain on constitutional grounds if the 
legislature takes steps to see to it that they get no more than 
that." 487 P.2d at 505 (quoting Gelfert v. National City Bank, 
313 U.S. 221 (1941) (citations omitted)). 
The 1985 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 cannot 
constitutionally be applied to contracts executed before the 
statute. The amendment cannot be justified on any public policy 
basis, and it does far more than merely affect procedural 
rights. The amendment has a significant substantive impact on 
the amount which the debtor must pay to prevent foreclosure. 
The trial court erred in denying Tanner's motion for summary 
judgment and granting the motion of plaintiff. 
POINT II 
THE TRUST DEED INCORPORATED THE FORECLOSURE 
PROVISIONS IN EFFECT WHEN IT WAS SIGNED. 
Plaintiff argues that the 1985 amendment simply permitted 
plaintiff to enforce the pervasive boiler plate provisions of 
the contracts which purported to permit plaintiff to accelerate 
the unpaid balance due upon default by the debtor. The analysis 
is incomplete. In addition to providing that the beneficiary 
under the Trust Deed has the right to accelerate the balance 
due, the Trust Deed also provided, in paragraph 27, that the 
beneficiary had the option to "foreclose this Trust Deed in the 
8 
•tovided t>Y Jaw lot tne foreclosure of mortgages on real 
property . . . . M 1'ln-1 i .asi-s r i ted i n pla inti t f * s initia 1 brief 
establish that the law existing at tn«" t; .1 IT i of ouirr» a<„ 3 
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PLAINTIFFS NOVEMBER 30, 1987, LETTER DID 
NOT OPERATE AS AN ELECTION TO JUDICIALLY 
FORECLOSE THE TRUST DEED. 
P l a i n t . 4 5 a r g u e . > y J.L& 'ounsel +: 
c e r t a . - * :;e de fendants •- wember , . :-7 . cons * 
e l e c r u a x c i a ^ v f o r e c l o s e 1 »• I r u s t Deed, and thereby 
p r e v e n t e d * - defendarv - - * * * r i g h t s which 
would : e . • ' - . . . f o r e c l o s u r e
 : power ; - if Aihu/li 
wou J \i wot he a v a i l a b l e * u d i c i a ] t •: r e c l o s u r e . Tanner 
acknowledges t h a t t h e demar * language which i s 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a j u d i c i a l f o r e c l o s u r e . (Tanner's i n i t i a l M i p f 
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established that the language is also consistent with a power of 
sale foreclosure. Brief of Appellants, Point III.) 
The issue is not, however, whether the demand letter would 
have permitted plaintiff to proceed by judicial foreclosure, but 
rather whether it constituted such a clear election of remedies 
as to have precluded plaintiff from proceeding with a power of 
sale foreclosure. The trust deed at issue and the applicable 
statutes provide that a beneficiary under a de€>d of trust has 
the option to foreclose by power of sale or to foreclose by 
judicial action. Each method has its attendant advantages and 
disadvantages. The issue in the present case is whether 
plaintiff could claim the advantages of a judicial foreclosure 
(or in other words, whether it could deprive Tanner of the 
advantages of a power of sale foreclosure), without also 
accepting the disadvantages. There must be a mutuality of 
obligation. See Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & 
Livestock Company Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985) (mutual-
ity of obligations required for an enforceable contract). If 
any election of remedies effected by the demand letter was not 
binding on plaintiff, it cannot have been binding and detri-
mental to defendants. 
The November 30, 1987, demand letter did not constitute a 
binding election of remedies. An election of remedies occurs 
only when there is (1) a choice between inconsistent remedies, 
and (2) a party chooses one remedy in such a manner as to (3) 
evidence an intent to forego all other remedies. Royal 
10 
Resources, Inc. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp., 50? r ^d nnr> 796 
(Utal Cook v. Covey-Baiiara Mutoi Co. *'* "*-..- 253 
. *-
 m
o ~ -
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 4. • ^nirury a 
particular : ...... :.-";f? .ear: elect el to 
proceec r\ ^udicial foreclosure whe, i t . - *• *. n 
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: \ Ar. Jur. *1 Election of Remedies i - ! rforris Plan 
Leasing Company v. Karnsf 19? Kan. 1 - - I 1 ~~" ""' 
(1966) . 
Tanner has established in his initial brief that the 
language of the demand letter is equally consistent with 
foreclosure hi, fm'wH u i-mii . I ••em assnmirn, arguendo, that the 
language is consistent only with judicial foreclosure, 1 lowever, 
the foregoing authorities establish that the demand letter did 
not constitute i IMP i'«l Mrulinq n 1 ei/t i on to proceed b^ that 
remedy only. 
Because any statements demand letter ill Vinf 
plaintiff to proceed • * < * •* ~ . * n similarly 
did not preclude defendants : • *xercising rights ava :u -
under -owei of sa?o foreclosure "hese r: *ht;- ncluding trie 
right * nu/r<* anv ecemuer xu, 
the time vr*-- ;. ]=i:r* ::r rr-ade a ccnoi^i.c *-*» t i on to proc 
indie - * reciosure LJ2 -S* : f * ; * : • . 2 *t on. Eve1 ; *e 
1985 amendment to nta* * ~.> < uefen-
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dants had a right to cure the default by paying the delinquent 
amounts at any time prior to the time plaintiff commenced its 
action to judicially foreclose the Trust Deed. 
POINT IV 
RIDGE ATHLETIC CLUBS TENDER WAS ADEQUATE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiff challenges the validity of the tender of Ridge 
Athletic Club made on December 7, 1987, on the ground that 
neither the Club nor Darrell Tanner had cash in hand or in an 
identifiable bank account on that date sufficient to pay the 
amounts tendered. The elements of a valid tender, however, are 
otherwise. The Club was not required to have cash in hand or in 
any bank, but rather was only required to "have the ability to 
produce it, and [to] act in good faith." Hymas v. Bamberger, 10 
Utah 3, 36 P. 202, 203 (1894). The only evidence submitted to 
the court in this case established that the Club did have the 
ability to produce the tendered amount and did act in good 
faith. 
Darrell Tanner unequivocally testified by affidavit that 
"on December 7, 1987, I had the ability to cause Ridge Athletic 
Club, Inc., to pay the sum of $119,200.00 as indicated in the 
tender." (R. 382.) In response to plaintiff's attempts to 
challenge this statement, Darrell Tanner acknowledged that he 
did not have that amount of cash in hand. He also clearly 
testified, however, that he could have obtained it from his 
brother (Depo. of Darrell D. Tanner, p. 49, lines 10-11), from 
12 
i•• red 11" 1 ines avai ] able t o h i m , fid., lines 18-19), and li) an 
advance on a loan tin! wris m (duress with f i f i «"*orp. (Xd. at p. 
48, lines 21-25,) 
There was no contrary evidence. Although the proceeds- of 
the Citicorp loan wcirr not ,w IUM I ly ci i sbu i sen In n,i i : «-•
 x lanner 
until December i: , :'•«> li* : -\- e^di.1;.- *h*+- the 
^ *-* ^ uouid nui i * ^curred December : •* had 
plaintiff accepted the - -i < * ", t-nat 
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^r . .cation - - testif pi There * * further no 
evidence .ntraj, brother 
was w.:;ang - -J-* : J advance • funds. Although L_.iintifffs 
ave aoubted v -*r-f^*c: ^ T*.N * ^  perform, as set 
fort *, ' r- obnect . - - ounsel 
were not /idence and woul f it--:, admissible had 
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The only admissible e . v * r -
of the tender establishes 1- it Darrel . I inner nad tiie at^** . -
c. : . r * perform * promised 
December - : j_ ^  -i: r -
required - produce
 : - * *\ r- ir/: ?n t \- Motio: : . 
; .- - •—. - : un Uic record, this Court ::.«st hoi', 
a matter : ~ ^ •> tender v 
I tu* ~ rernative, if this Court concludes that the tender 
i i idw, uiit; case must he remanded for 
an evidentiary hearing. The testimony of Dai reII 
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very least creates an issue of fact as to whether he had the 
ability to produce the money and tendered it in good faith. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE A SECURITY INTEREST 
IN NEW EQUIPMENT OF OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY 
ADDED BY TANNER OR THE RIDGE ATHLETIC CLUB, INC. 
Plaintiff asserts that its security interest in after-
acquired property operates to give it a security interest in 
personal property (including equipment) placed on the subject 
real property by Darrell D. Tanner ("Tanner") or The Ridge 
Athletic Club, Inc. ("Club"). This contention must fail because 
neither Tanner nor the Club signed a security agreement with 
plaintiff (the Club in addition did not sign a guaranty or any 
other document with plaintiff), and the personal property in 
question was not a replacement of the prior collateral. 
Plaintiff relies on three cases: Inter Mountain Associa-
tion of Credit Men v. Villager. Inc., 527 P.2d 664 (Utah 1974); 
Smiley v. Wheeler, 602 P.2d 209 (Okla. 1979) ? and American 
Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. 0. & E., Inc. , 40 Colo. App. 306, 
576 P.2d 566 (1978). Each is distinguishable because each case 
dealt with after-acquired property which was a replacement of 
the prior property, and the successor debtor was "related" to 
the original debtor. In Smiley, the creditor had a security 
interest in equipment, which the successor debtor later replaced 
with new equipment. 602 P. 2d at 211. American Heritage 
concerned inventory, where the successor debtor mingled the 
prior inventory with new inventory. 576 P.2d at 567. Villager 
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also concerned inventory which essentially replaced prior 
invf . . i- ,\ iiMim factor in the court's decision. 
.? : at : Lij same logic wouid not apply to new equip-
ment w h i c - added not as n replacement ot prior equipment, 
but in -j;-.i- - - * ne liujj. 
Properly read, Villager supports * • defendants' position 
in this ca^ ':" original debtor ir that case merged with 
three other . , *-: ••- 'at-on claimed its 
assets were not subject t. secu:;t: agreement executed • 
the origin- -ci?-.-— Th«- 7oi;rr. hei i * e property transferred 
from, the ^ . - - * • -• ' •f--t:nts subject to the 
after-acquired property clause : .--cv.r.^ y agreement. The 
creditor also claimed, however, that vne af*:e*-acquired property 
clause operated ii . »• ii .1 M.'MU I I •„ int-ei-pst on all of the 
property acquired by the successor corporati on, including that 
former :y owned by the other three former corporations. The 
C••:.:" -  ecUni 1 , , alter-acquired 
property clause only affected the inventory of the original 
debtor and *: replacements. 
1..: -*•: •-!--.-. property nt issue i ; i this » ase is p r ed o mi n ate-
ly equipment added by the Club in connection with an expansion 
of tn* ?' * : *  addition, the Club replaced existing equipment 
which *-*. i' 111' I in 1 tif i inii pu i ch.iseii the property. This 
"new" equipment and other personal property subject to 
] ~*i±r-fc> security interest - >ur as r*-t signed any 
security agreement or tinancn * • . .inti ff. 
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Although the assets it purchased from Sherwood Associates are 
subject to plaintiff's security interest, the new personal 
property it later purchased is not subject to plaintiff's 
security interest. See Q. T,, Inc. v. Thomas Russell & Co. , 
Inc. (In re Q. T.), 99 Bankr. 310 (Bankr. E. D. Va. 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
The 1985 amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 cannot 
constitutionally be applied to this case. Defendants had a 
right to cure the default at the time that The Ridge Athletic 
Club, Inc., tendered payment of the deficiency. The tender was 
adequate as a matter of law. The case should be remanded with 
instructions to grant Tanner's Motion for Summary Judgment. In 
the alternative, the case should be remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing on the sufficiency of the tender. 
DATED this 22nd day of January, 1990. 
JACKSON HOWARD and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
16 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
fnreqoi nrj rollowing, 'postage prepaid, this 
22nd day of January, 1990. 
Clark W. Sessions 
Cynthia K. Cassell 
Campbell Maack & Sessions 
First Interstate Plaza, Sui te 4 00 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1605 
17 
